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Abstract
Stylized facts play a significant role in the testing whether models agree
with known statistical anomalies and phenomena that occur in financial mar-
kets or not. Thus, we can use these stylized facts as a modeling tool or just
to understand the general behavior of financial markets better. In the pa-
per by Bouchaud et al in 2004 [1] we see the promotion of a new stylized
fact that correlations in trade signs fail to die out, even after large lags. In
fact, Bouchaud et al expressed the correlations as a slow power-law decay over
trade ticks. In the results of our empirical study of JSE and BM&FBOVESP
we find that the selected stocks show the this same power-law decay of cor-
relations of trade signs. We also find that the stocks behave in a way which
may allow for price manipulation at high enough trading rates as discussed
by Gatheral [2].
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1 Introduction
In empirical studies on stock price data, such as [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21], one finds several statistical anomalies in
the behavior of the stock price. Many of these have been quantified or have
been explained and formed into stylized facts.
In 2004, Bouchaud et al [1] formulated a new stylized fact that trade
sign correlations die off over a relatively long period as a slow power-law
decay. This new stylized fact lead Bouchaud et al [1] to contradict the widely
accepted idea that market impact is permanent. In Section 5.5 we discuss how
a permanent would cause the average response to be significantly amplified
with a large lag which we do not see in the empirical results. They provided
a strong argument suggesting that market impact has to be temporary and
suggested that it should decay as a power-law. Subsequent to the Bouchaud
et al [1] study, the effect has anecdotally been significantly reduced by market
activities1. However, the importance of quantifying such effects remains,
particularly in the context of emerging markets such as South Africa and
Brazil, where market developments have lagged those in developed markets.
To understand the complexity of the correlation, one has to first under-
stand the dynamics of the limit order-book and the process involved in the
optimal execution of a trade, explained by Obizhaeva and Wang in 2006 [22]
and Almgren and Chriss in 2000 [23], the competition between liquidity tak-
ers and liquidity providers, and how these affect the stock price over a short
time interval.
In what follows, we take a look at some of the fundamental ideas be-
hind some conclusions of past empirical studies as well as some practical
applications of these ideas.
1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis vs “Zero Intelligence
Agent” Model
The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that all of the information available
in a market will be reflected in the fair-value price of a stock and the price
1Private communication with T. Gebbie.
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emerges for a consensus amongst rational market participants who would
be likely to arbitrage away any deviation from the fair price [24, 25]. Thus
price changes would be the result of unpredictable changes in fundamental
information. Thus, the current stock price would be the best predictor of its
future price and therefore, the stock price should be a random walk in time.
In financial markets, we see stock prices exhibiting random walk like
behaviors. However, the volatilities observed in financial markets appear
to be too high to be compatible with rational pricing. We also see that
the frantic movement in the stock prices fails to fit the hypothesis and the
assumptions of fully informed agents and a fair price seem too strong to be
realistic.
The Zero Intelligence agent model suggests that prices follow a pure ran-
dom walk because, if an agent has zero intelligence and decides randomly
whether to buy or sell, their actions will be interpreted by other agents as
containing some information [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The mere fact that
the agent bought or sold would cause a shift in the stock price to a new
reference price from which the process could repeat itself, giving the stock
price a random walk like behavior.
Although both ideas seem to be rather impractical, they can be used
as viewpoints from which various anomalies can be understood. The true
behavior of a stock price should lie somewhere in the middle of these two
ideas. If we take a closer look at what drives the stock price, we find that
it is not a trivial random walk, but more a fine-tuned competition between
opposing market forces. Thus, it is vital that we understand the behavior of
market forces before we can understand the behavior of a stock price.
1.2 Market Forces
1.2.1 Lit Order-book Market
Market forces are the forces of supply and demand representing the influence
of market participants on the price and liquidity of equity in a market. On
exchanges, these forces are proxied limit orders and market orders. Limit
orders are orders to buy or sell a specified volume of a stock at a specified
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price, whereas market orders are orders to buy or sell a specified volume of
a stock without a specified price. It is through these two types of orders
that we can separate traders into two broad categories: liquidity takers, and
liquidity providers.
Liquidity takers use markets orders to initiate trades. In general, these
trades are time sensitive and are entered for immediate execution. Liquidity
takers often try to anticipate future movements in stock prices due to some
information they believe to be asymmetric and in their trade’s favor. They
will try to take full advantage of the information for profit. Often this infor-
mation is misinterpreted and does not affect the stock price at all, in which
case the bid-ask spread is lost. Alternatively it could have the opposite effect
to what was expected and more may be lost from the transaction.
Investors who are impatient or need to hedge or liquidate their position
as a matter of urgency take advantage of the fact that market orders are
executed immediately, even though it costs them the bid-ask spread.
Liquidity providers use limit orders to avoid taking unintended naked
positions. Their limit orders provide liquidity in the market by increasing
the volumes in the order-book and thus giving the market orders something
to execute against. Liquidity providers are able to make small margins of
profit from the bid-ask spread if the stock price doesn’t change while the
order remains within the order-book queue since the liquidity takers will buy
for higher than they sell for.
Now we can give some thought to the competition between liquidity takers
and liquidity providers. Let’s assume that a large number of market orders to
buy enter the system. The liquidity providers could see this as the liquidity
takers being informed that the stock is under priced and they might want
to increase their ask price because the stock price is likely to go up in the
near future if the liquidity takers are correctly informed. The liquidity takers
would then have to pay a considerably higher price for the stock and they
may not benefit from the transaction in the end. Thus the more prudent
approach would be to divide one’s larger orders into a number of smaller
trades and spread them as far as possible across the day so that as much
information as possible can be with-held from the liquidity providers. If the
liquidity takers’ views do not become transparent through the trade and no
information can be taken out of the trade the stock price should settle at its
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previous value. A mean reversive behavior can be seen in stock prices caused
by liquidity providers closing out their position and trying to keep the price
from moving as it would be costly for them if the stock price had to shift too
far from its original position.
1.2.2 Dark Pools
A dark pool of liquidity is an order matching facility which allows institutions
to execute large block [33] trades with a degree of anonymity and reduced
trading costs as a result of lower slippage. Dark pools are not available to
the public, but are used mainly by financial institutions when executing large
block trades or shifting large volumes of equity between funds. These dark
pool transactions could be executed through an electronic communication
system which bypasses the exchange when matching orders, or an over the
counter transaction between market participants.
The primary advantage of using a dark pools, especially for large institu-
tions, is to trade large volumes of stocks while withholding information that
is key to the institution’s operations from other large institutions who would
be likely to take advantage of this information. The fact that the size of the
trade is not revealed until the price is agreed upon by the participants would
also appeal larger institutions as it would reduce the market impact of the
trade.
The three main types of dark pools are comprised of: independent compa-
nies, broker-owned dark pools and dark pools created by public exchanges.
Independent company dark pools such as: Instinet Crossing, POSIT and
Liquidnet, among others, provide the platform for institutions to execute
their block trades outside of an exchange environment. Broker-owned dark
pools allow the clients to interact with each other without disclosing any
information prior to the agreement to execute a trade. Some examples of
broker-owned dark pools include: CITI markets and banking, Credit Suisse
and CrossStream. Public exchange dark pools, like International Securities
Exchange and NYSE Euronext, allow market larger participants to execute
their large volume trades in a similar environment to the exchange, but with
the added benefit of anonymity.
The main purpose of dark pools is to allow large volumes to be traded at
the current fair value, where as lit markets are used to determine the current
12
fair value. These are two different yet essential components of an effective
market.
1.3 Limit Order-book Dynamics
In their paper in 2006 [22] Obizhaeva and Wang considered the limit order-
book market. This market is arguably the closest to the definition of a what
one would refer to as a centralized market. They suggested that if one takes
a one-sided view the rate at which limit order-book would converge, to a so
called steady state after a trade has been executed is exponential (provided
that there are no fundamental shocks). The density of the steady state has
the form:
qt(P ) = q1{P≥At}, (1)
where t is relatively large, At = Vt + s/2 and Vt = F0 + λx0, Ft is the
fundamental value of the stock, At is the ask price, Vt is the mid-price and s
is the spread at time t. Directly after a trade they suggest that the ask price
will have the form:
At = Vt + s/2 + x0(1/q − λ)e−ρt, (2)
where x0 is the size of the initial trade and ρ ≥ 0 is the speed at which the
order-book converges and Vt = V0+ in absence of new trades and changes in
the fundamental value, which can be used when measuring the resilience of
a limit order-book. This is an important idea to appreciate, as most impact
models assume that the order-book will reach a new steady state directly
after a trade has taken place. One can see that a more realistic view would
be to work under the assumption that the order-book will converge in some
manner to a new steady state, but not immediately after a trade has been
executed because the executed trade would affect the supply of the stock and
limit orders would flow in to meet the gap in supply.
1.4 Optimal Trading Strategy
In previous optimal execution studies [21, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42],
we see numerous methodologies, strategies and systems for optimal order
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control. One of the focus in these studies is optimizing the execution of
orders in order to reduce the cost of trading. In this study we look at the
optimal trading strategy discussed by Obizhaeva and Wang [22].
Using the idea of the flow of limit orders Obizhaeva and Wang [22] discuss
a so called “optimal” trading strategy, that is a trading strategy that would
result minimal costs when executing a given trade. They suggested that an
optimal trading strategy should be a combination of discrete trades coupled
with a continuous stream of trades.
Using this framework they discovered that the optimal way of executing
a trade would involve a discrete trade at the beginning of the trading period
large enough to entice new limit orders into the order-book, but not high
enough to incur unnecessary costs, followed by a continuous stream of trades
just large enough to execute against the incoming limit orders and a large
discrete trade towards the close of the trading period to execute the remaining
portion of the trade.
Upon closer investigation they found that the size of the discrete trades,
and consequently the cost of the trading strategy, were inversely proportional
to the length of the trading period.
This provides a reasonable explanation for the long-term correlation be-
tween the trade signs. One of the shortfalls of this idea is the fact that they
do not consider the interference caused by other trades i.e. they look at a
market with only one market order trader.
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Figure 1: Optimal execution strategy, found by Obizhaeva and Wang [22] ,
with fixed discrete trade intervals. This figure plots the optimal trades for
trade periods of 10, 25 and 100 for respectively the top, middle and bottom
panels.
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2 Preliminary Market Micro-Structure
Market architecture, as described by Madavahn [43] is the set of rules govern-
ing the trading process. This architecture has facets that are market specific,
but [44] suggests that there are some statistical rules that govern market
structure across markets. Understanding market micro-structure and archi-
tecture is necessary for risk management when trading on multiple trading
venues and in managing optimal trade execution services. It is also necessary
for understanding the relationship been regulations, high-frequency trading
and market feed-backs. In this section we examine the behavior of intra-day
trade statistics and compare our results with previous studies. We do so for
two markets: the JSE and the BM&FBOVESPA. We discuss the possible
causes of certain behaviors and the implications of our findings. We also
examine some basic forms of price impact where to find that a one size fits
all approach is not always suitable; with factors such as liquidity and mar-
ket capitalization playing roles in determining the shape of a price impact
function.
2.1 Introduction
Following the work done by O’Hara [45], Hasbrouck [46] and Madhavan [43]
among others, in this section we will investigate some of the fundamental
micro-structures on the JSE. We will look at the shapes of intra-day volume
curves, intra-day return curves and other basic indicators of market behavior.
One of our main interests in this section is to better understand how price
movement relates to traded volumes. Although one would expect to find
that a large volume traded would have a greater effect on the price than a
smaller volume, this is not the case. It is often noted that a low volume can
be associated with a large price movement and a high volume with a small
price movement.
In this section we have decided to select five indicative stocks out of the 46
available for the JSE data so that our plots can be interpreted more efficiently
by the reader. These five stocks include:
• Anglo American Plc, a diversified mining and natural resource groups.
• Aspen Pharmacare, a supplier of branded and generic pharmaceuticals
in approximately 100 countries.
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• Bhp Billiton Plc, a diversified natural resources company.
• Mtn Group, a telecommunications provider.
• Standard Bank Group Limited, a banking and financial services provider.
These five have been selected as some have specific similarities while dif-
fering from the others. AGL and BIL are very liquid stocks with a large
market cap, MTN and SBK are what some would call “super” liquid stocks,
and APN is one of the more illiquid stocks in the Top40. This gives us a
good mix of related and unrelated industries, market caps, and liquidities for
comparison.
2.2 Intra-Day Volumes
In past empirical studies [1, 9, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 46, 52, 44, 53] it has been
found that intra-day volumes generally have a U-shape with some seasonal
events which affects the volume of most stocks. To avoid averaging out the
effects of the different opening times in Europe and USA during daylight
savings time, we decided to split the two time periods and look at the data
in each separately.
In Figure (2) we only look at trades that take place while both Europe
and the US are not in daylights savings time. For this we had to exclude
the data where any daylight saving is taking place, in particular the data
belonging to the period starting 14 March 2010 and ending 07 November
2010. We can clearly see the U-shape that has come to be expected when
looking at intra-day volume curves. One can also clearly see the effects of
the European markets opening on the volume traded. One sees no influence
from the US on South African markets outside of daylight savings time as
their markets open as our trading day comes to an end.
In Figure (3) we only look at trades that take place while both Europe
and the US are in daylights savings time. Thus, we look only at the data
for which the two daylight saving periods intersect in 2010, which is period
starting 28 March 2010 and ending 31 October 2010. Again we can clearly
see the U-shape that has come to be expected when looking at intra-day
volume curves. The influence on volume of European markets opening during
daylight savings time can be seen as our stocks come out of the morning
17
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Figure 2: Thirty minute average volume curves for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN
and SBK. This graph was done for the period outside of daylight savings time
in 2010, excluding data belonging to the period starting on the 14 March 2010
and ending on the 07 November 2010.
auction period. In this period the effects of the US markets opening before
our afternoon action period is important, but one also has to take in to
account the natural rise in trading activity as we approach the afternoon
auction. These together have a large effect on the volume traded.
In Figure (4) we only look at trades that take place while both Europe and
the US are not in daylights savings time. For this we had to exclude the data
where any daylight saving is taking place. To achieve this, we excluded the
data belonging to the period starting 14 March 2010 and ending 07 November
2010. After excluding daylight savings, we took the volumes traded in thirty
minute periods normalized by total volume traded on the day and averaged
these thirty minute quantities across the year. In this average relative volume
curve we get a better idea of how similar the behavior of intra-day volume is
for different stocks. In particular the behavior of APN becomes more similar
to the other stocks. The effects of foreign markets discussed in the average
daily volume curves are more obviously seen in the average relative volume
curve. It is interesting to note that the stocks with similar market cap and
liquidity are almost indistinguishable outside of daylight savings time.
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Figure 3: Thirty minute average volume curves for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN
and SBK. This graph was done for the period of daylight savings time in 2010,
so we have used data belonging to the period starting on the 28 March 2010
and ending on the 31 October 2010. The influence on volume of European
markets opening during daylight savings time can be seen as our stocks come
out of the morning auction period.
In Figure (5) we only look at trades that take place while both Europe and
the US are in daylights savings time. Thus we look only at the data for which
the two daylight saving periods intersect in 2010, which is period starting on
the 28 March 2010 and ending on the 31 October 2010. For this graph we
followed the same averaging procedure as we did for the non-daylight savings
time data. In this average relative volume curve we get a better idea of how
similar the behavior of intra-day volume is for different stocks. The effects
of foreign markets discussed in the average intra-day volume curves are more
obviously seen in the average relative volume curve.
When one looks at the seasonal effects in the JSE average intra-day vol-
ume curves for daylight savings time and non-daylight savings time, we see a
significant increase in the amount of volume being traded when foreign mar-
kets, such as Europe and USA, open. In Figure (3) and Figure (2) one can
see a clear U-shape in both volume curves which is consistent with previous
empirical findings.
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Figure 4: Thirty minute average relative volume curves for AGL, APN, BIL,
MTN and SBK. This graph was done for the period outside of daylight
savings time in 2010, so we have excluded data belonging to the period
starting on the 14 March 2010 and ending on the 07 November 2010. In
this average relative volume curve we get a better idea of how similar the
behavior of intra-day volume is for different stocks.
In Table (1) we have tabulated some indicative values related to volume
and liquidity of the five stocks which we have chosen. One can see that the
most liquid stock MTN has an average of 2405 trades executed each day with
an average of 5722900 shares traded each day and SBK which is also a very
liquid stock has slightly less, but they have similar prices. On the other end
of the scale we have APN which is one of the less liquid stocks in our data
only executing an average of 770 trades per day with an average of 86470
shares traded each day. We also see AGL and BIL having large quantities of
volume being moved, but they also have fairly high stock prices. AGL and
BIL are both liquid stocks, but they are not as liquid as MTN and SBK. The
liquidity of each stock seems to be influenced by not only the movement of
volume but also the price of the stock. It is important to note that we are
taking a market-order perspective and that the direction of trading has been
ignored.
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Figure 5: Thirty minute average relative volume curves for AGL, APN, BIL,
MTN and SBK. This graph was done for the period of daylight savings time
in 2010, so we have used data belonging to the period starting on the 28
March 2010 and ending on the 31 October 2010. In this average relative
volume curve we get a better idea of how similar the behavior of intra-day
volume is for different stocks.
2.3 Intra-Day Returns
In Figure (6) we have plotted the five minute returns for AGL in the period
starting on 10 March 2010 and ending 09 March 2011. The five minutes
returns for AGL can be seen as noise. The spikes in the returns occur at
times of market stress. Such as the flash crash on 06 May 2010.
The distribution of stock returns has been a topic which has been de-
bated in many papers like [54, 55, 56, 57, 58], among others. Aparicio and
Estrada [54] make a strong argument that daily returns do not follow a Nor-
mal distribution because of the leptokurtic behavior of said returns. In Figure
(7) and (8) we see that intra-day returns also have a leptokurtic behavior.
This could indicate that returns may have a leptokurtic behavior on multi-
ple grains and may warrant further investigation. Leptokurtic behavior has
also been viewed as the result of looking at price movement independently
21
Ticker AGL APN BIL MTN SBK
Average Trades Per Day 2088 770 1540 2405 1789
Average Trade Price 31064 8459 23788 11870 10712
Average Volume Per Day 3519495 869470 3185600 5722900 3830400
Table 1: Intra-day trade statistics for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN, SBK. In this
table we have displayed some of the trade statistics for our five indicative
stocks.
from volume; that once prices changes are corrected for volume effects, the
distribution can become more Normal [59].
The intra-day pattern in price variance was explained by Madhavan [60]
in terms of a structural model. They argued that the volatility is significantly
higher earlier in the day because of the higher inflow of information, which is
a reasonable explanation for the peaks in both average returns and average
absolute returns in the morning and afternoon auctions.
The intra-day average absolute returns for non-daylight savings and day-
light savings time are shown in Figure (11). The average absolute returns
seem to be closely correlated for similar stocks and seasonal effects were obvi-
ous in all five stocks. What is interesting is the fact that all five stocks seem
to have the same shape average absolute returns in the daylight savings time
data, which would also be the case for the non-daylight savings data if not
for the spike in AGL and BIL at 10am. It is also interesting that the aver-
age absolute returns seem to have a U-shape which which we see arising in
intra-day statistics.
Hasbrouck [51] argued that the higher price volatility at market open is
primarily due to higher volume of information being available. These studies
both find the impact of trading to be more significant at market open and
during the morning. This is clear in Figure (11) and Figure (12), as one can
see in both figures price movements are generally larger in the mornings.
In Figures (13) and (14) we have plotted the volatility of five minute
returns and thirty minute returns for each day in our data set. In order for
us to compare the two sets of daily volatilities we have scaled the five minute
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Figure 6: Five minute returns for AGL. Other than a few spikes, which we
have assumed to be caused by minor crashes and fundamental shocks, the
returns for AGL are what we have come to expect from return behavior. The
five minute returns of other stocks displayed the same behavior as that of
AGL.
return volatilities by a factor of root 6. We see, as one would expect, that the
daily volatilities using five minute returns has a mean greater than that of
the volatilities using thirty minute returns. This stems from the fact that as
one takes larger intervals in any data set out of a time series, one sees a more
prominent trend and the noise will be reduced. In terms of stock prices this
comes about as a direct result of the mean reversion caused by the liquidity
providers trying to keep the stock price from drifting too far from the current
value.
It is interesting to note that for the four liquid stocks we see that the daily
volatilities of the five minute returns all have a similar pattern which leads us
to believe that seasonality plays a role in the volatility of intra-day returns.
We also notice a few similarities when using the thirty minute returns, but
what really stands out is the behviour of the daily return volatilities in our
illiquid stock. The daily return volatilities for APN are generally larger than
those of the more liquid stocks, this is clearer when using thirty minute
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Figure 7: Distribution of thirty minute returns of AGL plotted against an
equivalent Normal distribution.
returns, which leads us to believe that the spikes in the daily thirty minute
return volatilities of the other stocks would point towards low liquidity on
those days.
Through this we also learn that one should not choose a specific interval
size when working with intra-day data, but rather use a few interval sizes as
we see above. If we had taken only five minute return data we would have
lost important information.
We noted in our study that there is no particular pattern with regards
to the average five minute returns. As one sees in Figure (9) there is no
distinguishable trend. As one can see in Table (2) that the means of returns
are almost insignificant whereas the volatility is relatively large and similar
for all but our illiquid stock.
24
−0.01−0.005 0 0.005 0.01
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Return
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Distribution of Returns
 
 
−0.01−0.005 0 0.005 0.01
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Return
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Distribution of Returns
 
 
−0.01−0.005 0 0.005 0.01
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Return
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Distribution of Returns
 
 
−0.01−0.005 0 0.005 0.01
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Return
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Distribution of Returns
 
 
SBK
Normal Distribution
BIL
Normal Distribution
MTN
Normal Distribution
APN
Normal Distribution
Figure 8: Distribution of thirty minute returns of APN, BIL, MTN and SBK
plotted against an equivalent Normal distribution.
Ticker AGL APN BIL MTN SBK
Mean 0.00054 -0.00012 -0.00052 -0.00017 -0.00032
Volatility 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.17
Skewness 0.0036 0.1676 -0.0764 0.0911 0.1357
Table 2: Intra-day five minute return statistics for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN,
SBK. We have tabulated some return statistics for our five indicative stocks.
We see that the illiquid stock has returns which are more volatile than the
others which is to be expected. It is interesting to note that the other four
stocks have returns with almost the same volatility.
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Figure 9: Thirty minute average returns for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN and SBK.
This graph was done for the period outside of daylight savings time in 2010,
so we have excluded data belonging to the period starting on the 14 March
2010 and ending on the 07 November 2010. In this figure we have plotted the
returns of each stock for the sixteen thirty minute periods in our trading day,
averaged across the year. One sees that, other than the few points where the
returns of two or more stocks seem to behave similarly, there is no significant
relationship between the intra-day returns of out five chosen stocks.
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Figure 10: Thirty minute average returns for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN and
SBK. This graph was done for the period of daylight savings time in 2010,
so we have used data belonging to the period starting on the 28 March
2010 and ending on the 31 October 2010. In this figure we have plotted the
returns of each stock for the sixteen thirty minute periods in our trading day,
averaged across the year. One sees that, other than the few points where the
returns of two or more stocks seem to behave similarly, there is no significant
relationship between the intra-day returns of our five chosen stocks.
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Figure 11: Thirty minute average absolute returns for AGL, APN, BIL, MTN
and SBK. This graph was done for the period outside of daylight savings time
in 2010, so we have excluded data belonging to the period starting on the 14
March 2010 and ending on the 07 November 2010. Using absolute average
returns as a proxy for return volatility we see that volatility is high coming
out of and going into auction periods, but we can also see the volatility does
not remain constant during continuous trading which is similar to a result
found by [61]. One can also see that, other than the spike in AGL and BIL,
the return volatility for these five stocks behave similarly through the day.
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Figure 12: Thirty minute average absolute returns for AGL, APN, BIL,
MTN and SBK. This graph was done for the period of daylight savings time
in 2010, so we have used data belonging to the period starting on the 28
March 2010 and ending on the 31 October 2010. Using absolute average
returns as a proxy for return volatility we see that volatility is high coming
out of and going into auction periods, but we can also see the volatility does
not remain constant during continuous trading which is similar to a result
found by [61]. One can also see that the return volatility for these five stocks
behave similarly through the day.
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Figure 13: Daily Volatility of returns of AGL. In the figure we have plotted
the volatility of five minute returns and thirty minute returns for each day
in our data set. To avoid misinterpretation we have scaled our five minute
return volatilities to a thirty minute scale so that we can compare the two
sets of results. One can see that over the 251 days the mean of the average
thirty minute intra-day return volatility is significantly smaller than that of
our shorter time frame results. We noted that in the thirty minute return
volatilities there is clear grouping of spikes after the 200th trading day in
our period that is not present in the five minute return volatilities, and clear
grouping of spikes around the 50th day in the five minute return volatilities
that is absent from the thirty minute return volatilities. Along with these
three differences, we also see that there is a significant difference in trend
of the return volatilities through the year. Hence, there is no fixed relation-
ship between volatilities over different intervals, confirming appropriateness
of nondeterministic stochastic models (stochastic volatility or at least non
constant local volatility).
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Figure 14: Daily Volatility of returns of APN, BIL, MTN and SBK. In the
figure we have plotted the volatility of five minute returns and thirty minute
returns for each day in our data set. To avoid misinterpretation we have
scaled our five minute return volatilities to a thirty minute scale so that we
can compare the two sets of results. One can see that over the 251 days the
mean of the average thirty minute intra-day return volatility is significantly
smaller than that of our shorter time frame results. We noted that in the
thirty minute return volatilities there is clear grouping of spikes after the
200th trading day in our period that is not present in the five minute re-
turn volatilities, and clear grouping of spikes around the 50th day in the five
minute return volatilities that is absent from the thirty minute return volatil-
ities. Along with these three differences we also see that there is a significant
differences in trend of the return volatilities through the year. Hence, there is
no fixed relationship between volatilities over different intervals, confirming
appropriateness of nondeterministic stochastic models.
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2.4 Intra-Day Spreads and Liquidity
In financial markets liquidity can be defined as the degree to which a stock can
be traded in the market with no affect on the stock’s value. Many liquidity
measures such as spreads and price impact, among others, are used to gauge
the degree of liquidity displayed by an asset. Factors which contribute to
liquidity include: transaction costs, rate of order execution as well as order-
book depth and breadth and resilience.
Transaction costs consist of bid-ask spreads as well as other costs incurred
when an order is executed, such as admin costs, slippage e.t.c. Rate of order
execution refers to how fast an incoming trade is executed. This can be
affected by communication latency if the trading sever is remotely located,
as was the case for the JSE equity trading sever for the period we have
focused on. Order-book resilience as we briefly explained in Section 1 refers
to the rate at which new limit orders arrive to fill the order-book. Order-
book depth refers to the range of prices available in the order-book. And the
breadth of an order-book refers to the amount of volume available in said
order-book. In Figure (15) we have an illustration of the examples of depth
and breadth when taking a one-sided view of an order-book.
Sarr and Lybek [62] explained that liquid markets and, by extension,
liquid stocks should exhibit the following characteristics:
• Low transaction costs which would require a small bid-ask spread and
low implicit costs.
• Efficient order execution in other words incoming orders should be
matched and cleared with minimal delay.
• Order-books should be deep and broad by having large volumes as well
as a wide spread of order prices.
• Strong order-book resilience which would mean that limit-orders flow
in at a rate high enough to keep the spreads and prices from drifting
to for from its current position after an order has been executed.
One of the key factors in the liquidity of a stock is the behavior of its
spreads. Preceding research has found that bid-ask spreads are largely de-
termined by trading activity, incoming information, competition between
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Figure 15: In this figure we have given some examples to illustrate how one
would identify different depths and breadths in the sell side of an order-book.
As one can see a deep order-book is characterized by having a wide range
of different priced orders, while a shallow order-book would only have small
range of prices attached to the orders. A broad order-book has large amounts
of volume available while a thin order-book does not have much volume to
offer.
market participants and risk. McInish and Wood [63] found that there is an
inverse relationship between trading activity and the level of spreads. They
also found intra-day bid-ask spreads on the NYSE to have what they refer
to as a crude reverse J-shape. In more recent studies this has come to be
known as a U-shape or an L-shape, but the results are still similar.
Our results regarding intra-day spreads are in line with previous empirical
studies. Again we have filtered the data such that it is split into two groups,
the first containing only those entries which occur outside of daylight savings
time and the second containing only those entries which occur within daylight
savings time. Daylight savings time in 2010 for the UK started on Sunday
March 28 and ended on Sunday October 31, whereas daylight savings time
for the USA started on Sunday March 14 and ended Sunday November 7,
thus we excluded any data from 14 March 2010 to 28 March 2010 as well as
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Figure 16: Thirty minute average daily spreads for the period of daylight
savings time. One can see in the figure that spreads drop in the after morning
auction and climb slowly when it approaches the end of the trading period,
which is consistent with past studies.
31 October 2010 to 7 November 2010.
One can see in Figure (16) and Figure (17) that spreads drop after the
morning auction and climb slowly towards the end of the day, which is con-
sistent with past studies. The large drop after the morning auction is due
to the fact that incoming orders can be somewhat erratic during the auction
period leading to large and sometimes negative spreads. Although there is
a significant inflation in the size of spreads within the daylight savings time
period as seen in Figure (16), it is still clear that we have a similar spread
behavior in both data sets.
So far we have discussed some of the factors which contribute towards
the liquidity of a stock such as, the behavior of volume traded throughout
the day, the amount of volume matched per trade and the behavior of the
bid-ask spreads. We will now look at determining periods of high and low
liquidity, but first we have to have a brief discussion on effective spreads.
Chordia et al [49] described the effective spread as being twice the absolute
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Figure 17: Thirty minute average daily spreads for the period outside of
daylight savings time. One can see in the figure that spreads drop in the
after morning auction and climb slowly as it reaches the close of the trading
period, which is consistent with past studies.
distance between the trade price and the mid-price at the time of the trade
averaged over the day. One can see how this statistic incorporates the effects
of the order-book depth and is more insight into the liquidity of a stock.
In our results we found the intra-day behavior of the un-averaged effective
spreads to be random with no particular trend, not too dissimilar to the
behavior of intra-day returns.
However this effective spread statistic can be used to determine days of
high or low liquidity within a period. Since the average spread of a stock
may vary throughout the year due to changes in the stock price and market
behaviour, we have detrended our effective spread linearly across our 251
trading days. Using these detrended effective spread we are able to compare
liquidity between trading days. Chordia et al [49] defined a “low liquidity”
day as one with a detrended effective spread which is at least one standard
deviation above the mean. A day with a detrended effective spread which
is within one standard deviation of the mean is then classified as a “high
liquidity” day, with no middle ground between the two classes.
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To compute our daily average effective spread we took our five minute
intra-day effective spreads, which are calculated by taking double the ab-
solute difference between the trade price and the mid-price, and averaging
across the day. Then to remove drift we detrend the daily average ESPR
(effective spread). Once this is done we are able to calculate the mean and
standard deviation and decide which days are “low liquidity” days and which
are not.
A problem arises, as one can see in Figure (18), when we have outliers in
the data caused by fundamental shocks. These outliers artificially inflate our
average statistics and hence cause us to classify fewer days as “low liquidity”
days. To compensate for this problem we have removed outliers from the
data when calculating a trimmed mean and standard deviation to use for our
decision bound. The detrended average daily effective spreads are plotted in
Figure 18 against the decision bound as well as the trimmed decision bound.
To identify possible seasonality in stock liquidity we compared the de-
trended average daily effective spreads. The detrended ESPR is plotted in
Figure (19) for the other four stocks in our 251 trading day period. In all
five stocks one sees a group of low liquidity days found between trading day
201 and 205 which corresponds to the 24th and the 31st of December 2010.
There are no other groupings of low liquidity days which are common
among the stocks which leads us to conclude that the last five trading days
in the year have a significant effect on the average liquidity of a stock.
A drop in liquidity could cause an opportunity for price manipulation.
Gatheral [2] proposed that if a stock has a power-law price impact function
and a low liquidity, then there would be room for arbitrage. In this period of
low liquidity the opportunity for arbitrage could be subdued by the general
lack of trading causing a shortage in order-book depth. There would also be
a risk that once the price has moved sufficiently for one to profit that there
would be no matching orders to execute the closing out of one’s position. It
is beyond the scope of this project to acquire the data and re-construct the
order-book to investigate further.
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Figure 18: The detrended average daily effective spreads are plotted in order
to determine periods of high and low liquidity in AGL. The red dashed line
is the mean plus one standard deviation bound which is used as described
by Chordia et al [49] to determine whether it has been a high or a low
liquidity day. One can see that there is at least one outlier in this data
set. To avoid over inflation of our mean and standard deviation we have
removed outliers and used the trimmed statistics to get a more reasonable
one standard deviation bound. Our trimmed bound is plotted as a green
dashed line. In either case our low liquidity days lie above our bound, but
our trimmed bound clearly has more data above it than our untrimmed
bound.
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Figure 19: The detrended average daily effective spreads are plotted in order
to compare periods of high and low liquidity in our five stocks. The red
dashed line is our mean plus one standard deviation bound which is used as
described by Chordia et al [49] to determine whether it has been a high or a
low liquidity day. One can see that there is at least one outlier in each data
set, so to avoid over inflation of our mean and standard deviation we have
removed outliers and used the trimmed statistics to get a more reasonable
one standard deviation bound. Our trimmed bound is plotted as a green
dashed line. In either case our low liquidity days lie above our bound, but
our trimmed bound clearly has more data above it than our untrimmed
bound.
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Ticker AGL APN BIL MTN SBK
Mean 0.0484 0.0359 0.0386 0.0207 0.0185
Standard Deviation 0.0741 0.0352 0.0525 0.0265 0.0157
Trimmed Mean 0.0405 0.0332 0.0340 0.0190 0.0174
Trimmed Standard Deviation 0.0307 0.0239 0.0274 0.0146 0.0129
Low Liquidity Days 7 14 11 10 23
Low Liquidity Days (Trimmed) 22 21 18 19 26
High Liquidity Day % 91 91 93 92 89
Table 3: Detrended daily average effective spread statistics in rands for AGL,
APN, BIL, MTN and SBK. As described by Chordia et al [49] we have used
a measure of one standard deviation above the mean of the average daily
effective spread to determine whether it has been a “high liquidity” or a
“low liquidity” day. A problem arises when outliers in the data caused by
fundamental shocks artificially inflate the mean and standard deviation. To
avoid this problem we have trimmed the data of all outliers which makes a
significant difference as one sees in the results above.
2.5 Basic Price Impact Analysis
The behavior of prices in response to new orders is significant factor when
trying to understand the dynamics of a market. This is seen in many studies
on price impact or stock price fluctuations [3, 5, 64, 8, 29, 30, 11, 12, 18, 19,
20, 21, 65]. The generalization is that if a trade causes a small change in
price, we describe the market as liquid; otherwise it is illiquid.
A price impact function is a function which quantifies the effects of the
volume of stock being traded on the price of that stock. There are several
impact models documented in academic literature. A key consideration is
whether impact is permanent or temporary are not unified. Bouchaud et al
[1], argue that because of the auto-correlation of trade signs, impact has to be
temporary. We review this model in the next chapter. Keim and Madhavan
[66], and Almgren et al [67] argue that the price impact can be decomposed
into permanent and temporary components.
Although most traders and academics believe that linearity is too sim-
plistic an assumption, they disagree over what type of behavior price impact
functions should follow. Some arguments have been made for convex and
concave impact functions, but one still faces the question of what degree of
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convexity or concavity the impact function takes. Any empirical findings as
to the shape of the impact function, cannot be assumed to be universal, as
impact can vary between different markets, across different sectors, or even
between different liquidity brackets within a market.
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Figure 20: Five minute price movements plotted against the five minute nett
volumes relating to that period for AGL, APN, BIL and MTN. Buys are
represented by positive volumes and sells by negative volume.
One would expects liquidity to depend on a stocks properties, such as
volume and market capitalization. Following the work done by Lillo et al
[44], we take a look at average effect a trade of a given size would have on
the stock price.
In Figure (20) we can see that large volumes traded in a period seems to
have less effect on the stock price than for smaller volumes. This is interesting
as one would expect large volumes to have a large effect on the stock price and
smaller volumes to have a negligible effect. One can see that this is clearly
not the case. It is also important to note that the price seems to move with
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as well as against the direction of trading. We note that the price seems to
be affected more by the smaller volume trades. We also notice that the APN
shows an almost vertical scatter, showing large returns for small volumes
which is a clear indication that the price does not revert easily and the stock
is therefore illiquid when compared to the others. On the other hand we see
that MTN has many larger volumes which have had almost no effect on the
price which implies that the stock is very. Thus, the liquid stocks namely
AGL and BIL seem to have a star shape. One can also see that there seems
to be a slightly hyperbolic shape to these figures which would suggest that
the stock price is more likely to move up with a buy and down with a sell
than the converse.
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Figure 21: Five minute absolute returns plotted against the five minute vol-
umes relating to that period for AGL. We see that for those few trades with
a high return the volume of the trade is relatively low and for those trades
which a high volume we see a relatively low. This is in contradiction with
the common assumption that large volumes of trade have a greater effect on
the stock price than that of lower volumes.
In Figure (21), where we plot the absolute returns against volume, we
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find that for trades with a volume of less than 20 000 we see a vague but
unquantifiable relation to the size of the return, between 0 and 0.6 percent.
Any trades with larger volumes or returns seem to show an almost hyperbolic
relationship between volume and size of returns.
Lillo et al [44] selected 1000 of the largest firms on the NYSE from 1995-
98 and calculated a price impact for each firm. They found that the price
impacts of all stocks showed similar power-law behavior. After scaling the
price impacts using stock liquidity and market capitalization they all con-
formed to a single function that they called the master curve. In their study
they took a buyer-initiated view. In our study we have looked at both sides
of the order-book.
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Figure 22: Buyer-initiated price impact for our five selected stocks. One sees
that the impacts of stocks with similar liquidities have similar behaviors. We
also note that only AGL and BIL display a power-law shaped impact similar
to that found by Lillo et al [44].
In order to compare our price-impact results to those described above we
have followed the same procedure as Lillo et al [44]. First we split our data
into buy and sell orders then for each group we bin the transactions in terms
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of order size. After sorting the data we took the logarithm of the mid-price
before and after a trade has occurred to be l(ti) and l(ti+1) respectively.
Then our price shift becomes ∆l(ti+1) = l(ti+1)− l(ti), for any trade that is
followed by a consecutive trade we set ∆l(ti+1) = 0, since in this instance we
are looking at a one lag impact on the mid-price consecutive trades would
taint our results. To be able to compare the price-shifts we normalize the
volumes by dividing through by the average volume per trade for each stock
which gives us our ω.
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Figure 23: Seller-initiated price impact for our five selected stocks. As one
would expect, the seller initiated price impact is seen to have a similar shape
to a negative version of the buyer-initiated price impact. One sees that the
impacts of stocks with similar liquidities have similar behaviors. We also
note that only AGL and BIL display a power-law shaped impact similar to
that found by Lillo et al[44].
In Figure (22) and (23) we have plotted the buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated price impact for our five selected stocks. One sees that the impacts
of our five stocks display a power-law shaped impact similar to that found
by Lillo et al [44]. The price impact of APN is seen to be less smooth than
the other four. This could be due to the fact that these are more liquid large
cap stocks similar to those investigated in [44]. Since we find that our impact
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functions do not all have a similar smooth shape we assume that the master
curve for price impact is contingent on the stocks having a similar market
cap and liquidity.
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
One problem that arose when averaging our intra-day data across days is
that intra-day seasonal effects such as foreign markets opening were affected
by daylight savings time. If one does not account for this, seasonal effects
are lost due to over averaging, so for our study we chose to separate the
periods of daylight savings and non-daylight savings time when averaging
time dependent statistics.
When we look at our intra-day volume results we see that the opening of
trade on foreign markets has a significant effect on the volume traded in the
liquid as well as the more illiquid stocks. We see these effects more clearly
when we compare the results for the period within daylight savings time
with those outside of daylight savings time. From these results we realize
that any time dependent intra-day computations should take this time shift
into consideration in order to avoid over averaging and loss of important
information. Our results on relative volumes show that there is a strong
relationship between the relative volumes being traded for different stocks
throughout the day. This suggests that there is some driving factor for the
market as a whole when it comes to intra-day volumes.
In our five minute returns data we saw no patterns across the year and
other than a few spikes, which we assume to be due to fundamental shocks
or intra-day crashes, there was no information to be taken from the time
series. Our average thirty minute returns were also very erratic and we
only saw a few seasonal effects which were common among similar stocks.
When we looked at thirty minute average absolute returns we found that,
other than one spike in AGL and BIL, all five stocks displayed a similar
behavior and the intra-day average absolute returns had a U-shape which
seems to be common among intra-day statistics. We then found the average
volatility across each day using five minute returns as well as thirty minute
returns. The results showed that there seems to be a relationship between
thirty minute return volatility and daily liquidity and when we use smaller
intervals for our returns the volatility per period increases. We also saw
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that there were seasonal effects present in all stocks when using five minute
returns that weren’t present when using thirty minute returns and vice versa.
Thus we concluded that when one chooses only one interval size, as opposed
to many, important information can be lost.
For our five selected stocks we find that their spreads behave similar to the
results of previous studies by McInish and Wood [63] among others. We find
as described our spreads drop rapidly coming out of the opening auction and
rise slowly until the closing auction period, giving them a L-shape or what
some describe as a crude J-shape. Using effective daily spreads to analyze
liquidity we found that all of our stocks had a cluster of low liquidity days
between the 24th and the 31st of December 2010, which is to be expected
because of the holiday season and the broken trading week. Other than that
there were only a few randomly scattered low liquidity days for each stock.
We also found that our five selected stocks all had high liquidity days for
around 90% of our 251 day period.
When looking at basic price-impact we found that there was a strong
relationship between price-impact and liquidity. Out of the five stocks we
chose, two were very liquid, two were liquid and one was relatively illiquid.
The results supported our classification of the each stock’s liquidity. We
found in our data that a large trade volume does not necessarily cause a
large price movement and a large price movement does not necessarily come
from a large trade, in the results we found that quite often the inverse was
true. This result has been noted in previous studies. When we looked at the
one lag impact on the mid-price as done by Lillo et al [44], we found that the
stocks in similar brackets of liquidity had similar shaped impact functions.
Upon closer inspection we found that markets are more complex than
they appear. One of the more noticable achievements of the micro-structure
literature is success in shedding a bit of light on the otherwise opaque world
of stock price behavior in financial markets The understanding of order flow
and the fact that it could have a significant effect on the stock prices has
some practical implications. The issues addressed in these studies should
be relevant for exchange officials, trading system developers, regulators, and
traders. Although certain anomalies and statistical rule are common in most
markets, a one size fits all approache to strategic trading, regulation and
policy making needs to be avoided.
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3 Trade Sign Behavior
3.1 Auto-Correlation of Trade Signs
In our previous discussions we can see that the random-walk nature and the
reaction of liquidity providers to the trading done by liquidity takers suggests
that the idea of a ”zero intelligence” trader market could help us understand
the financial markets from a quantitative view. This model is however qual-
itatively incorrect: although the stock prices are weakly correlated at best,
the correlations between the signs of trades are strong and fail to die out.
This stems from the splitting of orders and spreading them over time to with-
hold demand information, or the implementation of optimal trading strategy
that we discussed in section 1.4.
In our study we define our trade sign at time n n = 1 if the stock has
been bought and n = −1 if the stock has been sold.
A basic function for the correlation of the signs over a lag of ` trades,
starting with the n-th trade, can be given by:
C0(`) = E(nn+`), (3)
where n is the sign of the n-th trade.
In [1] it was shown that the auto-correlation in the sign of trades didn’t
die out for the stock studied, even after 1000 lags. Figure (24) shows that
our analysis yields the same (truncated) power-law behavior for all 46 stocks.
As one can see in Figure (24) our results were similar to those found in [1],
but in this study we only see results for a single stock. In order to compare
our results as a market we have repeated these computations for 27 stocks
on the BM&FBOVESPA exchange. The results are shown in Figure (25).
We found that for these two very different markets that the results come out
to be very similar to each other. We also found that all 73 stocks have the
same power-law behavior that fails to die out that was found in [1].
Following [1], where the auto-correlations can be reasonably considered
to have the form:
C0(`) ' C0
`γ
, (4)
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using the techniques described by Clauset, Shalizi and Newman [68] we find
C0 ≈ 0.26 ± 0.074 and γ ≈ 0.32 ± 0.06 In [1], it was found that C0 ≈ 0.2
but γ ≈ 1
5
, and γ ≈ 2
3
, for FT and Total respectively. The similar auto-
correlation result seems to hold well for all 46 stocks; which could suggest
that γ is market dependent. This is not surprising as the stocks we studied
were all part of the basket of underlyings for the most liquid index future
traded on SAFEX5: the ALSI TOP 40. Our results show that we consistently
find γ < 1.
Let us now look at the two related correlation functions, described by
Bouchaud et al [1], that should appear naturally in the stock price function,
namely:
C1(`) = E(n+`n lnVn) (5)
and
C2(`) = E(n+` lnVn+`n lnVn). (6)
These “mixed” correlation functions can be found, empirically, to be pro-
portional to C0(`):
C1(`) ≈ E(lnV )C0(`) C2(`) ≈ E(lnV )2C0(`). (7)
There are systematic deviations, which indicate that long range correla-
tions are affected more significantly by smaller volumes than larger volumes.
4The 1-σ error is from averaging over all 46 stocks measured auto-correlations.
5South African Futures Exchange
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Figure 24: In this figure we plot the auto-correlation of the trade signs of
the 46 stocks on the JSE. We note that for all 46 stocks the auto-correlation
fails to die out even after a large number of trades. All of our stocks display
a power-law behavior in their trade sign auto-correlations which is the same
result found by Bouchaud et al [1], C0(`) ' C0`γ . We also found that C0 ≈
0.26± 0.073 and γ ≈ 0.32± 0.06 for the JSE stocks (where [1] finds C0 ≈ 0.2
but γ ≈ 1
5
, and γ ≈ 2
3
, for FT and Total respectively). The similar auto-
correlation result seems to hold well for all 46 stocks; which could suggest
that γ is market dependent.
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Figure 25: In this figure we plot the auto-correlation of the trade signs of
the 27 stocks for the BM&FBOVESPA data. We note that for all 27stocks
the auto-correlation fails to die out even after a large number of trades. One
also sees that all of the display a power-law behavior in their trade sign
auto-correlations which is the same result found in our JSE data and in [1],
C0(`) ' C0`γ . Two of the auto-correlations seem to behave differently, but the
others all have the same shape lie near each other which means that they
would share a common γ. One thing that is different from our JSE results is
the fact that these auto-correlations are significantly smoother.
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3.2 Trade Sign Clustering
Taking into account the correlation of the trade signs over long lags and the
idea of a optimal trading strategy and splitting up of market orders to with-
hold information, we went on to take a closer look at the behavior of the
trade signs. On closer inspection one sees clustering of the same signs as is
seen in Figure (26), this can be linked to this explanation of the correlation
of the signs.
To investigate the clustering, we condensed the trade signs into runs of
either positive or negative i.e. if there only are 3 positive signs followed by
6 negative signs our “runs” vector would read (3 6). After capturing the
“runs” information we found that the “runs” data had a behavior similar to
that of a geometrically distributed random variable. Upon closer inspection
one finds that the distribution of the positive “runs” differs from that of the
negative “runs”.
When using our runs statistics from our data to simulate trade signs
we found that the auto-correlation of the simulated signs behaved similarly
to the signs in the data for lags of up to 10, but then they would die off
exponentially. This contradicts our findings in the data that auto-correlation
of trade signs fails to die out even after large lags. This would suggest that
there are other factors at play and that the trade sign clustering is not the
sole cause of this behavior in our trade sign data.
Negative TradeSigns Positive TradeSigns
Statistics Mean V olatility Mean V olatility
AGL 2.34 2.26 2.38 2.36
APN 2.55 3.14 2.53 3.21
BIL 2.35 2.33 2.41 2.43
MTN 2.25 2.21 2.26 2.27
SBK 2.32 2.41 2.33 2.58
Table 4: In this table we have some statistics regarding the trade signs of
AGL, APN, BIL, MTN, SBK. One can see that the positive and negative
runs for each stock have slightly different distributions. This suggests an
overall dominance of one sign in each of the stocks. The dominance of one
sign in each stock gives us a reasonable explanation for why trade signs are
strongly correlated over a relatively long period.
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Figure 26: In this figure we plot 100 trade signs of the AGL, APN and SBK
stocks taken from an arbitrary day in our range of data. Note that for all
3 stocks there is a clear clustering of trade signs. In this short period one
can see that traders favored buying AGL and APN while they were in favor
of selling SBK. We also found, using the same method as Bouchaud et al
[1], some of our trade signs came to be zero. This does not give us any
information as to whether a buy or a sell transaction has occurred, taking a
market order perspective. It does suggest that the transaction was executed
at midprice, for example, as if it had taken place in a dark pool. This may
suggest the presence of ”book-over” type trades due to off-market agreement
between participants but executed through the central order-book as normal
continuous trading period transactions. In this study we disregard trades
such as demarcated book-over trades as we are investigating trade statistics
and price-impacts in a lit-market.
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Figure 27: In this figure we have plotted the distributions for the positive as
well as the negative signs of the AGL, APN and SBK stocks across the year.
Note that all 3 stocks have a similar distribution when it comes to their trade
sign clustering. Since these distributions are discrete and have similar means
and volatilities, we have assumed that they follow a geometric distribution.
One can see in Table (4) that the positive and negative runs for each stock
have slightly different distributions. This suggests that overall one side is
dominated by the other.
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For the period under investigation the negative “runs” dominated the
positive “runs” for 40 of the 46 stocks across the year. We found that if one
looks at smaller periods of days or weeks, then positive “runs” are sometimes
dominant. This behavior is indicative of a market consensus or a general
reaction to stock price movements by participants. This may also have an
effect on the correlation of the trade signs.
In Figure (28) we have plotted the cumulative trade signs for AGL, APN
and SBK across the year so that this negative sign dominance and the smaller
periods of positive sign dominance can be seen.
This long-term dominant behavior gives us a reasonable explanation for
why the trade sign correlations are strong and fail to die out, even after a
thousand trades.
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Figure 28: In this figure we plot the cumulative trade signs of the AGL,
APN and SBK stocks across the year. This figure illustrates that there is a
dominance of negative trade signs over the year in question. Apart from the
overall dominance one sees a dominance of either positive or negative trade
signs when one looks at smaller periods. The relatively long term auto-
correlation of trade signs could be explained by the fact that the market
moved in a negative or positive direction over small periods and thus the
signs in these periods would be strongly correlated.
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4 Cost of Trading Models
In this section, we review the concepts of cost of trading and examine the
models for market impact suggested by Gatheral in 2009 [2] and Gatheral,
Schied and Slynko in 2010 [69]. In these studies we see stock price, St at
time t in the form:
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds+
∫ t
0
σdZs (8)
where x˙s is our rate of trading in at time s < t, f(x˙s) is the impact of
trading on the stock price at time s and G(t− s) is what they describe as a
decay factor.
Zs is a Brownian Motion, thus St follows an arithmetic random walk
with a drift component which is dependent on the cumulative impacts of
prior trades.
Gatheral et al [2, 69] refers to f(.) as the instantaneous market impact
function and to G(.) as the decay kernel. They show that the continuous
time process Eq(8) can be viewed as a limit of the discrete time process:
St =
∑
i<t
f(δxi)G(t− i) + S0 +Noise, (9)
where δxi = x˙iδt is the volume traded in a small time interval δt, f(.)
is the market impact function and S0 is the initial price. δxi > 0 would
represtnt buying of stock and δxi < 0 the sale of stock. The discrete repre-
sentation is in line with the ideas of Bouchaud et al [1].
If the number of shares outstanding at time t is given by xt. Gatheral et
al [2, 69] find the expected cost C[Π] associated with a given trading strategy
Π = Xt to be:
C[Π] = E
[∫ T
0
x˙t(St − S0)dt
]
=
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds. (10)
The dxt = x˙tdt shares traded at time t will then be traded at an expected
price of
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St = S0 +
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds,
which will reflect the residual impacts of previous trades. The cost of
trading is then given by the expected short-fall.
4.1 Special Cases
Below are some of the cost of trading functions described by Gatheral et al
[2] for some established impact functions and how you would arive at these
functions using the cost of trading function he described.
Bouchaud et al. [1]
Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters, and Wyart (2004) [1] assume that we have
f(v) ∝ log(v) and
G(t− s) ∝ l0
(l0 + t− s)γ ,
with γ ≈ (1−α)/2 where α is the exponent for the trade sign autocorrela-
tion power law (also see [27]). In Bouchaud et al’s model [1], market impact
decays as a power law and the price impact becomes concave in the trading
rate. The cost of trading becomes:
C[Π] =
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds
∝
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
log(x˙s)
(l0 + t− s)γ ds.
Almgren et al. [67]
The temporary component of the model of Almgren, Thum, Hauptmann,
and Li (2005) [67] corresponds to setting G(t−s) = δ(t−s) and f(v) = ησvβ
with β = 0.6. Here, σ is volatility and vt = x˙t/V is a dimensionless measure
of the rate of trading, where V is the market volume per unit time (average
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intra-day volume, say). In Almgren et al’s [67] model, the price impact
dies out immediately. Any trading will only affect the price at the time of
executions; other executions will not affected. The cost of trading becomes:
C[Π] =
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds
= ησ
∫ T
0
x˙1+βt dt.
Obizhaeva and Wang [22]
In Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) [22], the form G(τ) = e−ρτ and f(v) ∝ v
was considered. In Obizhaeva and Wang’s [22] model, the price impact decays
exponentially and immediately price impact becomes linear in the trading
rate. The cost of trading becomes:
C[Π] =
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds
∝
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
x˙s exp{−ρ(t− s)}ds.
Alfonsi, Schied, and Schulz (2007) [70] also assumed that the decay of
price impact is exponential, but they assume that the price impact function
is nonlinear.
As the shape and behavior of the price impact function changes the cost of
a trade and consequently the optimal trading strategy will change. Although
the strategy will change, the idea of order-book convergence, discussed in
Section 1.3, where after a trade the order-book will fill until it reaches a new
steady state, suggested by Obizhaeva and Wang [22] ensures that the strategy
involving “eating off” incoming orders is relevant regardless of the shape or
behavior of the price impact function. Thus the shape of the optimal trading
strategy is similar for different impact functions, only the size of the trades
would vary.
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5 Price Impact Statistics
5.1 Introduction
Despite advances in the field, no standard approach for modeling price impact
has emerged. Since the early contributions of Hasbrouck [50] and Bertsimas
and Lo [71], price impact models have been used in the development of opti-
mal trading strategies of large orders [22], its relation to other studied quan-
tities such as liquidity [72] and the existence of arbitrage at high frequency
[2, 73] . More realistic models of the price-discovery process consistent with
economic theory have been developed [7].
For example, price impact is proxied by price change as a convex function
of volume in [44] and by price change as a linear function of order flow
imbalance in [74]. The measurement of autocorrelations [17, 75, 76, 77], in the
signs of trades provides a robust, albeit blunt measure to detect of existence of
some stylized fact. With the number of trades per day for JSE-listed stock in
our investigation varying between 600 and 10 000, a more refined, yet equally
easily measurable quantity, is the response function, R(`) = E[(pn+`−pn)n],
proposed in [1] which we will discuss later in this section.
Although many comments have been made about the relevance of Bouchaud
et al’s model in current circumstances, with high frequency trading playing
a large role in developed markets, we believe that it is still relevant in the
South-African market.
For the analysis done in this paper we analyzed Thompson-Reuters Tick
History data for 46 stocks6 listed on the JSE from 10 March 2010 to 9 March
2011. There are two possible methods involved in this analysis. One is to
focus on each day’s continuous trading period individually, with the assump-
tion that the impact of trading is an intra-day effect we pursue this approach.
Our original data was made up of trade price, best bid, best ask and trade
time for 251 full days of trading. The average number of trades, across all
6The tickers for these stocks are: ABL, AGL, AMS, ANG, APN, ARI, ASA, BIL, BTI,
BVT, CFR, CSO, DSY, EXX, FSR, GFI, GRT, HAR, IMP, INP, IPL, KIO, LON, MNP,
MSM, MTN, NED, NPN, NTC, OML, PPC, RDF, REI, REM, RMH, SAB, SAP, SBK,
SHF, SHP, SLM, SOL, TBS, TRU, VOD and WHL. The associated company information
can be found on the JSE website www.jse.co.za
58
46 stocks, was 802 trades per day which is equivalent to an average spacing
34.71 seconds between trades. Since we are focusing on intra-day continuous
trading we removed any data from before 09h01 and after 16h45, to remove
any effects of the opening and closing auctions.
We then used this data to calculate: n, the sign of a trade executed at
trade time n where n = +1 for a buy order and n = −1 for a sell order.
We determine whether a trade is a buy or a sell by checking the trade price
against the corresponding mid price, if the stock traded higher than the mid
price we treat the trade as a buy and lower than the mid price we treat it
as a sell. The lagged price difference, pn+` − pn, where pn is the price before
the nth trade and ` is the trade lag between the two.
In using the continuous trading period between opening and closing auc-
tion for our study, we faced the issue of a decreasing number of data points
in each day as we increase our trade lag. Since we are not crossing days, at
higher lags the less active days for a stock would be excluded from the data
set. This leads to a loss of generality of our empirical study. In order to
avoid deviations in our statistics due to lack of data points, we assumed that
the median of trades per day, for each stock, would be a reasonable stopping
point when calculating our statistics.
Since Bouchaud et al [1] have focused on one stock for the purposes of
their study, below we have computed the diffusion and response functions for
our 46 JSE stocks as well as 27 BM&FBOVESPA stocks.
We found that a problem of deciding on an appropriate cut-off point for
the lags occurred when computing related statistics. When one looks at the
amount of trading that occurs during each day, one sees large differences not
only in the different stocks, but in different trading days of any particular
stock. If one had to take the maximum trades occurring in a day for each
stock as a cut-off point, the statistics one would obtain for the higher lags
would be meaningless as they would be computed using a very small pool of
data. We use the median of trades per day as a cut-off point, or `max, since
in this case no less than half of the data would be used in computation of
said statistics.
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Figure 29: We have plotted
√D(`)/` as a function of ` for all 46 stocks. One
sees that the bigger tick stocks seem to have a sub-diffusive behavior while
the smaller tick stocks have a relatively diffusive behavior.
5.2 Diffusion Function
If we take the price pn as being the price of a stock before the nth trade and
n to be the sign attached to said trade. The diffusion function is given by:
D(`) = E[(pn+` − pn)2]. (11)
If we do not see any relationship between consecutive changes in price, D(`)
has a purely diffusive behavior:
D(`) = D`,
where D is a constant.
Figure (29) shows that for stocks with very small tick sizes
√D(`)/`
remains relatively constant even after large lags. This suggests diffusive
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Figure 30: Here we plot
√D(`)/` as a function of ` for all the bigger tick size
stocks in our BM&FBOVESPA data. One sees that the bigger tick stocks
seem to have a sub-diffusive behavior. This behavior suggests that mean
reversion is at play in all of these stocks.
behavior of stock prices, even at a granular level, for the more liquid stocks.
It is also noted that the D(`)/` for stocks with large tick sizes decays slowly.
This sub-diffusive behavior corresponds to an anti-persistent effect.
To investigate this apparent difference between large tick and small tick
stocks we studied these two groups separately and found that the small tick
stocks also have a sub-diffusive behavior. In Figure (30) and (31) we have
plotted the trade increments of the BM&FBOVESPA stocks separately for
the big tick and small tick stocks to show that both groups have similar
behavior on different scales.
We see that both groups of BM&FBOVESPA stocks have the same sub-
diffusive behavior which suggests all the BM&FBOVESPA stocks in our
study seem to be mean-reversive.
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Figure 31: In this figure we have plotted
√D(`)/` as a function of ` for all
the smaller tick size stocks in our BM&FBOVESPA data. One sees that
the small tick stocks seem to have a sub-diffusive behavior. This behavior
suggests that mean reversion is at play in all of these stocks.
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As one can see in Figure (29) when the stocks are not separated by their
tick size, the data is misinterpreted. Thus we realize that the tick size of a
stock is an important factor when doing a large scale study of stock markets.
5.3 Empirical Response Function and Market Impact
We follow Bouchaud et al [1] to better understand the impact that trading
has on the change in stock price using the response function, R:
R(`) = E[(pn+` − pn)n], (12)
where n is the trade sign described the previous section and pn is price
before the trade executed at time n. The quantity R shows us the average
price movement after ` ticks relative to an order at time n. This is an
aggregate function and is not used define the effect of a single trade, it also
does not take the volume of the trade into account. Below we have the
response functions of the 46 stocks:
In Figure (32) an almost constant behavior seems to appear in the “small
tick” stocks, but when we looked at each stock separately we found that
each empirical response function had its own shape which was not constant
even in the short term. Similar to the results of Bouchaud et al [1], we find
that our empirical response functions are positive. Since we are taking a
market-order side view we assume that a significant portion of this response
could be a ripple effect of the order-book moving in the direction of the
trade. Like Bouchaud et al [1], we also found that the empirical response
functions seem to misbehave after around 100 lags which would suggest that
the price-impacts or our stocks are temporary.
In Figure (33) and (34) we have again plotted the response functions of
the big tick and small tick BM&FBOVESPA stocks separately. One sees, for
all the stocks, that the empirical response function is non-constant. Again we
see a positive response in the BM&FBOVESPA stocks. We also see that the
empirical responses of the small tick stocks tend to misbehave after around
100 lags, where as the big tick stocks could misbehave sooner than 100 lags.
One can see in Figure (32) that when the results of an empirical study are
not viewed in the right scale, they can be misinterpreted.
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A more detailed function can be defined by taking into account the volume
V of the n-th trade:
R(`, V ) = E[(pn+` − pn)n/Vn = V ]. (13)
Prior to the work of Bouchuad et al [1] it was proposed that the depen-
dence of the response function on volume should logarithmic. A time depen-
dent form of R(`, V ) has not been investigated as thoroughly as the average
response function. Results published in [31] reported that the conditional
response function R(`, V ) can be factorized:
R(`, V ) ≈ R(`)f(V ),
where
f(V ) ∝ lnV. (14)
The average response function R(`) shows us the effect of the sign of a
trade to the average price change. The variance of this effect is large and
increases over time. A way to see this is to study the impact variables given
by: u` = (pn+` − pn)n. R(`) is the expected value of u` and D(`) is the
expected value of u2` . We found that R(`) is fairly steady and D(`) grows
over time. Thus we see that the effect and visibility of the impact of one
trade is lost after a few lags.
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Figure 32: Here we plotR(`) as a function of ` for all 46 stocks. Similar to the
results of Bouchaud et al [1], we find that our empirical response functions
are positive. We also see that our response functions seem to misbehave
after 100 lags for most of these stocks, this was also seen in the response
function of the FT stock studied by Bouchaud et al [1]. When we plot the
big tick and small tick stocks together, their response functions seem to be
constant up to 100 lags. When we looked at each stock separately we found
that the average responses were anything but constant. To illustrate this
we have again plotted the response functions of the big tick and small tick
BM&FBOVESPA stocks separately in Figure (33) and (34).
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Figure 33: In this figure we have plotted R(`) as a function of ` for all
the larger tick stocks in our BM&FBOVESPA data. For the big tick
BM&FBOVESPA stocks we see, that their empirical response functions are
positive and also misbehave after 100 lags.
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Figure 34: In this figure we have plotted R(`) as a function of ` for all the
smaller tick size stocks in our BM&FBOVESPA data. For the smaller tick
BM&FBOVESPA stocks we see, that the empirical response functions are
positive and also misbehave after 100 lags.
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5.4 Distribution of Impact Variables
Bouchaud et al analyzed the distribution of u`. When they fixed the lag at ` =
128 for example they observed a thicker positive tail and when shifted 0.02
units to the left, the distribution became almost symmetric. They argued
that if one had to take an EMH view point this shift could be seen as the
proportion of properly informed agents in the market, whereas the “ZIA”
model would suggest that this shift is caused by the bid-ask spread(cost of
trading), they noted that the typical bid-ask spread on the stock was close
to 0.02 euros.
Figure 35: The distribution of the ul at l = 128 as found by Bouchaud et al [1]
for the FT stock. They found that the distribution of their impact variables
computed for the FT stock had a thicker positive tail. One would expect
this as the average response, which is derived from these impact variables,
was found to be positive in their study.
Figure (35) depicts the distribution of the impact variable of the French-
Telecom stock in [1]. In this study it was found that the distribution of the
impact variables was slightly positively skewed. One would expect this as the
empirical response was found to be positive in this study and this empirical
response is merely the mean of the impact variables at different lags.
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In our study we found that our u` variables had a positive mean as well as
being positively skewed as one sees in Table (5) where we have a few statistics
of the u` variables for three selected lag points for one of our stocks. These
statistics are consistent with our results on the average response.
u10 u100 u1000
Mean 0.0526 0.0545 0.0652
Variance 0.1288 1.0903 8.7102
Skewness 0.1397 0.0500 0.0164
Kurtosis 5.6086 4.2369 3.2284
Table 5: AGL u` statistics for lags of 10, 100 and 1000.
In Table (5) we see that as one increases the lag, the variance of the impact
variables increases greatly and the skewness and kurtosis tend towards zero,
while the mean remains relatively constant. From this we conclude that
impacts over longer lags tend to become noise and thus the impacts seem to
be temporary. We see also that our mean and skewness are both positive in
all three cases which is consistent with [1], and the positive response functions
which we found for the JSE and BM&FBOVESPA data.
In Figure (36) we see the same positive skewness in the distribution of
u100 for AGL. Like Bouchaud et al we also see that slight shift, 0.1 units to
the left, in the negative tail would make the distribution symmetric.
We see the same skewness for BIL, MTN and SBK, with negative tail
shifts of 0.1, 0.03 and 0.03 units respectively, required for symmetry. How-
ever we see the opposite behavior in the u100’s for APN, which are negatively
skewed and requires the positive tail to shift by 0.02 units to achieve sym-
metry.
This behavior was expected as we saw the empirical response function of
APN become negative before 100 lags. As it is one of the less liquid stocks in
the study one would expect its response function to misbehave earlier than
others as it has less trades taking place, as well as lower volumes being trader
each day than most of the other stocks.
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Figure 36: Plot of the distribution of the u`’s at a lag of 100 for AGL. We
have plotted both the positive and negative tail on the same set of axes so
that the skewness is visible. We have also plotted a shifted version of the
negative tail which shows that if we move the negative tail 0.1 units to the
left the distribution would be almost symmetric.
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5.5 Stock Price Modelling for Price Impact
We consider a trade superposition model, used by Bouchaud et al [1], of the
impact of one given trade propagated up to time n, where the price at time
n is written as the sum of all past trades:
pn =
∑
n<n′
G0(n− n′)n′ lnVn′ +
∑
n<n′
ηn′ , (15)
where G0(.) is the ‘bare impact’ function for a trade on a subsequent
price fluctuation. This ‘bare impact’ function is assumed to be a non random
function that is only dependent on time lags. The ηn are random variables
and are assumed to be independent of the n. These ηn are residual values
and are used to model any source of price change that cannot be described
by the direct impact of trading e.g. changes in the bid-ask spread.
The ‘bare impact’ function G0(`) is defined as the average impact of a
trade after ` trades. This could theoretically be fitted using empirical data,
but it would cost too much to make it practical.
Using this representation, Bouchaud et al [1] defined the price increment
between an arbitrarily chosen initial time 0 and time ` as:
p` − p0 =
∑
0≤n<`
G0(`− n)n lnVn
+
∑
n<0
[G0(`− n)−G0(−n)]n lnVn +
∑
0≤n<`
ηn. (16)
If the trade signs n were independent random variables, it would make
the computation of the response and diffusion function a much simpler task.
The response function would be given by:
R(`) = E(lnV )G0(`), (17)
and the bare impact function and the response function would be directly
proportional.
In our study of trade sign auto-correlation we found, like Bouchaud et al
[1], that in our ’s have long range correlations. Thus our average response
functions should be computed as:
71
R(`) = E(lnV )G0(`) +
∑
0<n<`
G0(`− n)C1(n)
+
∑
n>0
[G0(`+ n)−G0(n)]C1(n). (18)
If the price impact of every trade was permanent, i.e. G0(`) = G0, ac-
cording to Bouchaud et al [1], we would get:
R(`) = E(lnV )G0
[
1 +
∑
0<n<l
C0(n)
]
, (19)
using Eq (6). If C0(n) dies down as a power-law with an exponent γ < 1,
then R(`) will be amplified by a significantly large factor as ` increases.
This is how Bouchaud et al [1] discovered that the bare impact function
G0(`) should decay with time, as it would need to offset the amplification
effect of the trade correlations. They conclude that price impact cannot be
permanent.
Bouchaud et al [1] also argue that the integral of C0(`) can be understood
as the effective number of correlated successive trades i.e.
Ne ' 1 +
n∑
`=1
C0(`) ≈ 1 + C0
1− γn
1−γ, (20)
consecutive trades.
For our case, we find Ne ∼ 35, meaning that the effect of one trade should
be amplified by a factor of 35. Which in turn would imply that the response
and diffusion functions should increase by a factor of 35 in our empirical data
- which we do not observe, nor did [1].
5.6 Fitting a Bare-Impact Function
From the empirical constraint that D(`) must be approximately linear in `,
Eq (6) Bouchaud et al made the ansatz that the bare impact function G0(`)
also decays as a power-law:
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G0(`) =
R0
(`0 + `)β
(` ≥ 1). (21)
It follows that one can estimate D(`) in the large ` limit.
For the purposes of our study, we have chosen to use 500 lags as a cut
off point for D(`) and 200 lags for R(`) when fitting the empirical data to
the model. This is due to the fact that the empirical R(`) functions tend to
misbehave in the higher lags and whereas the the empirical D(`) functions
tend to be smoother for most lag points. We also see that some of the more
illiquid stocks have very few trades in a day, for these stocks the statistics in
the higher lags would be tainted by the fact that we would not have a large
enough data pool.
5.6.1 Fitting β
In [1] Bouchaud et al find that the general formula for the diffusion has the
form:
D(`) = E(ln2 V )
[ ∑
0≤n<`
G20(`− n) +
∑
n>0
[G0(`+ n)−G0(n)]2
]
+ 2∆(`) + Dη`, (22)
where ∆(`) is the contribution of the effect of the correlations:
∆(`) =
∑
0≤n<n′<`
G0(`− n)G0(`− n′)C2(n′ − n)
+
∑
0<n<n′
[G0(`+ n)−G0(n)][G0(`+ n′)−G0(n′)]C2(n′ − n)
+
∑
0≤n<`
∑
n′>0
G0(`− n)[G0(`+ n′)−G0(n′)]C2(n′ + n). (23)
When γ < 1, one finds that the ∆(`) is dominant, and all three terms
scale a `2−2β−γ, provided β < 1. Therefore, the Hurst exponent of price
change becomes 2H = 2− 2β − γ. Thus for purely diffusive fluctuations,
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β =
1− γ
2
. (24)
If the price is sub-diffusive
β >
1− γ
2
(25)
and if the price is super-diffusive
β <
1− γ
2
. (26)
The problem in Eq (20) was resolved in [1] using that β ≈ (1− γ)/2 such
that the slowly decaying response function, R(`), with exponent β needs to
exactly cancel the slow decaying auto-correlation of the trades with exponent
γ in order to fit the diffusive nature of the data 7. Considering a power law
in the bare impact function for their micro-structure model they found the
Hurst exponent of the price fluctuations to be 2H = 2 − 2β − γ. This
implies that if price fluctuations are diffusive (H = 1
2
) over long-horizons
that β ≈ (1 − γ)/2. This means that if the auto-correlations in the sign of
trades had long-memory8, then β < 1
2
(as 0 < γ < 1) .This is consistent with
our results.
Using the fact that D(`) ∝ `2−2β−γ, we were able to fit β′s using our
empirical D(`)′s for AGL, APN and SBK. For the fitting procedure we used
our empirical D(1) (D(1)) as a constant such that we get our function to be
D(`) = D(1)`2−2β−γ. Thus at ` = 1 the ` term in our function collapses and
we are left with our empirical D(1).
One can see from Figure (37) and (38) that D(`) = D(1)`2−2β−γ is a good
to fit the diffusion functions of AGL, APN and SBK. In Table (5) we also
see that our R2 statistics for our fitting procedure show us that more than
95% of the variance in the empirical results of D(`) is expained by the model
when using the statistics shown in the table.
Huberman and Stanzl [78] argued that there is only one value for which
models of permanent market impact are free from arbitrage: when β =
7UsingR(`) ∝∑0<n<` C1(n) where C1 ≈ C0(`)E(lnV ) such that γ < 1 ⇒ R(`) ∼ `1−γ
8A long-memory process has H = 1− γ2 , a short-memory process is H = 12
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Figure 37: In this figure we show a brief graphical interpretation of the
underlying procedure involved in fitting a β to the D(`) function of AGL. As
one can see, when using γ = 0.4666 as we found when fitting the C0(`) for
AGL, we find a good fit using a β around 0.35.
1. Since our β 6= 1, it could either mean arbitrage opportunities exist or
can be interpreted as excluding a permanent market impact effect from our
dynamics.
Gatheral [2] argues that β ≥ 2 − ln 3
ln 2
≈ 0.4; faster decay is theoretically
ruled out by no-dynamic arbitrage. This implies γ ≤ 1 − 2β ≈ 0.2. Our
result appears to violate with the conditions of no-dynamic-arbitrage. The
principle of no-dynamic arbitrage can be understood as the idea that price
manipulation is not possible. No price manipulation [2] means that a round-
trip trade [78] must not have a negative cost. The empirical deviations from
the γ ≤ 1− 2β condition, which empirically permits price manipulation, can
be interpreted to imply that market agents do not just use a linear forecast
of order flow when adapting their trading to market conditions [2].
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Figure 38: Here we have plotted our results of fitting β for APN and SBK.
When using γ = 0.3092 and γ = 0.3092, found when fitting a power-law
function to C0(`), to fit our empirical D(`) for APN and SBK respectively
both have a good fit. Our β for APN is found to be around 0.56, while for
SBK we find β ≈ 0.49 give us a good fit for the diffusion function.
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5.6.2 Fitting `0 and R0
After fitting a β for each stock we are left with two parameters in Eq (18)
that we need to solve for. The procedure for fitting values to `0 and R0 is
more complicated than fitting β. This involves fitting our empirical R(`)’s
to the discrete sum Eq (18) which cannot be condensed into a simple form
like we saw earlier that the D(`) could. This fitting procedure involved high
performance computing techniques as well as the use of a miniature super
computer. Even with these resource, the R(`) fitting procedure was a time
consuming endeavor.
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Figure 39: In this figure we have the empirical R(`) for AGL against 5
different response functions using the Eq (18), the best fit we achieved with
`0 = 9, R0 = 0.0144 and β = 0.35. We found that AGL had a reasonable fit
with an R2 of 0.7.
In our section on the response function we noted the response function
tends to misbehave at larger lags, to prevent this from affecting our fitting
process we reduced our lags to a maximum of 200. To simplify the procedure
we have decided to use the first point in our empirical response function to
back solve for R0. This leaves us with one parameter to fit. We used a brute
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force sum for different values of `0 to try and fit our empirical results to Eq
(18).
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Figure 40: In this figure we show the empirical R(`) for APN and SBK
plotted against their best fit response functions. We see that these two
stocks fit even better to the model than AGL with both R2’s around 0.95.
We found that for most of our stocks we could not find an a `0 that
would allow for an acceptable fit, in fact the results of our fitting showed
that the shape of our empirical response functions were not consistent with
the possible shapes of the proposed model. This may suggest that most of
our 46 stocks do not have a power-law bare impact function as described by
Bouchaud et al [1].
5.6.3 BGPW Model Fitting Results
We have tabulated the statistics, for the five stocks, found during the fitting
procedure below. These can be used to compute the C0(`), D(`) and R(`)
functions as described by the model.
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Ticker AGL APN BIL MTN SBK
C0 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.17
D(1) 0.0281 0.0129 0.0228 0.0057 0.0047
γ 0.4666 0.3092 0.3430 0.3295 0.3033
β 0.3543 0.5632 0.4247 0.4910 0.4922
R2(D(`)) 0.9927 0.9877 0.9935 0.9818 0.9887
R0 0.0144 0.0071 0.0166 0.0079 0.0075
`0 9 1 11 14 14
R2(R(`)) 0.7003 0.9537 0.5665 0.8432 0.94874
Table 6: This table shows some of the statistics involved in fitting the diffu-
sion function to empirical data for AGL, APN and SBK.
One can see in Table (6) that in all cases more than 95% of the variance
in our empirical D(`) is explained by the fitted model. This shows us that
D(`) = D(1)`2−2β−γ is a good model for the diffusion function.
The model for R(`) is not as airtight as that of D(`) with only three of
the stocks having an R2 of more than 0.8 and only 56.65% of the variance
of in the empirical response function of BIL can be explained by the fitted
model.
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6 Conclusion
In our study, we found that the intra-day information in the markets inves-
tigated is readily available. The availability of data provides for an exciting
opportunity to study the price discovery process central to modern financial
markets. The study of such data requires a sophisticated understanding of a
market structures, regulation and micro-structure. Such studies require the
ability to manage and analyze large inhomogeneously sampled datasets with
heterogeneous data types and a variety of noise sources. As such, this type
of analysis falls squarely in the domain of big-data, computational finance
and market-micro-structure.
The importance of understanding market micro-structure and knowing
the price-impact function for specific stocks is seen on a practical level when
trying to minimize trading cost as a result of slippage. Although one can use
Dark Pools to execute large trades with relative anonymity, such trades still
rely on reference prices from Lit Markets and, as such, the processes of price
discovery and information aggregation investigated in this project in terms
of price impact still remain important.
Trading costs can be a significant factor in asset management and hedge
funds where the company’s livelihood is performance based. Thus, it becomes
prudent to understand the dynamics at play. One of the important issues
investigated by market micro-structure studies is market manipulation.
Gatheral [2], among others, suggested that price manipulation would be
possible amongst low liquidity stocks. We see that this could be the case but
that attempts to move the price would affect the liquidity dynamics of the
stock and, as such, the feedbacks in the system would make it difficult to
realize a profit without sophisticated feedback-control information into one’s
trading algorithms, in order to control the risk and return profile of such
trading strategies.
In our examination of intra-day trade statistics, we found that for our five
selected JSE stocks: the intra-day average volumes have a U-shape across
the day, intra-day return distributions have a leptokurtic behavior, intra-
day spreads have a L-shape peaking in the morning and becoming more
steady across the day. When looking at price impact we found that lower
trade volumes tend to be associated with higher returns and vice versa give
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volumes and returns an almost hyperbolic relationship. We also saw, like
Lillo et al [44], that the one lag price impact had similar behaviors for our
five selected stocks.
Similar to the results of Bouchaud et al [1] we find that our trade signs
have a long term auto-correlation; this suggests that the price impact of
trading on the JSE should be temporary. In our empirical diffusion functions
we find that the stock price, for our JSE stocks, has a sub diffusive behavior.
We also find that the empirical response functions are positive and misbehave
after about 100 lags. When we looked at the distributions of the u`’s we see
that they are positively skewed and a slight shift could make the distributions
more symmetric.
When fitting our empirical data to the BGPW [1] model we find that
our trade sign auto-correlations can be fitted to C0(`) = C0`γ , we found that
for our JSE stocks γ ≈ 0.32. Using D(`) = D(1)`2−2β−γ to fit our diffusion
functions we find that β ≈ 0.47 for our JSE stocks. We note that our γ’s
and β’s behave in such a way that γ ≥ 1− 2β, which break the no-dynamic
arbitrage constraint discussed by Gatheral [2], this suggests that there may
be an opportunity for price manipulation at high enough trading rates. When
fitting the R(`) function we had mixed results, seeing strong fits for APN,
MTN and SBK, and less acceptable fits for AGL and BIL which suggests
that some stocks may require a different shape of ‘bare impact’ function.
After studying some of the key factors of price impact and the shapes
and general behavior of price impact curves; we are of the opinion that, al-
though there are certain circumstances where price manipulation is possible,
in the context of the South African market it remains to be seen whether one
can consistently profit from price manipulation without asymmetric access
to either information, the markets involved or a significant commitment of
capital in order to move prices in order to game other algorithms. It is be-
coming increasingly clear that there is a grey area between what is or is not
considered price-manipulation from a market regulation perspective; for ex-
ample, algorithms that are aiming to achieve best execution for client trades
through the exploitation of sophisticated algorithms which can purposefully
impact prices in order to achieve such objectives.
It is critical that the regulatory environment is cognisant of developments
in market micro-structure as changes in market structure can inadvertently
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provide asymmetric advantages to various participants. Having said that,
there is a variety of features in modern markets to ensure that price dynamics
are fair and transparent given that sophisticated market manipulation is in
fact possible due to the lead-lag effects created by the dynamics between
volume and prices, as we have documented in this study. The boundary
between such price manipulations and what is or is not permitted in terms
of the trading rules and regulation of a given trading venue, needs to be
understood and monitored with significant care.
This study did not include an analysis of the auction period. Neither the
opening nor closing auctions. In order to have a more complete understanding
of the market structure an inclusion of the closing auction is necessary. This
is important as many large market participants often prefer trading at the
market close, both as an attempt to target the market closing price, which is
important for portfolio attribute of pension funds, as well as providing large
players improved volume and an environment where the risk of being gamed
by other market participants is reduced because of the volumes involved.
One important reason for the study of market-micro structure would be
the build of a catalog of stylized facts that could be used as a minimal set of
required behavior that one would require from a simulated market. It could
be useful to build a simulated South African market with the aim of recover-
ing the stylized facts that our type of study catalogues. Such a development
would allow us to carry-out numerical experiments towards understanding
the impact of various changes in both the agents participating in the mar-
kets as well as changes due to market-structure and regulation, although this
would be beyond the scope of this project. Understanding the phenomenol-
ogy of the South African market is an important component of being able to
realistically simulate such a market.
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A Stocks Used In Study
A.1 JSE Stocks
Equity Code Company
ABL African Bank Investments Ltd
AGL Anglo American PLC
AMS Anglo American Platinum Ltd
ANG AngloGold Ashanti Ltd
APN Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd
ARI African Rainbow Minerals Ltd
ASA Barclays Africa Group Ltd
BIL BHP Billiton PLC
BTI British American Tobacco PLC
BVT Bidvest Group Ltd
CFR Cie Financiere Richemont SA
CSO Intu Properties PLC
DSY Discovery Ltd
EXX Exxaro Resources Ltd
FSR FirstRand Ltd
GFI Gold Fields Ltd
GRT Growthpoint Properties Ltd
HAR Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd
IMP Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd
INP Investec PLC
IPL Imperial Holdings Ltd
KIO Kumba Iron Ore Ltd
LON Lonmin PLC
MNP Mondi PLC
MSM Massmart Holdings Ltd
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Equity Code Company
MTN MTN Group Ltd
NED Nedbank Group Ltd
NPN Naspers Ltd
NTC Netcare Ltd
OML Old Mutual PLC
PPC PPC Ltd
RDF Redefine Properties Ltd
REI Reinet Investments SCA
REM Remgro Ltd
RMH RMB Holdings Ltd
SAB SABMiller PLC
SAP Sappi Ltd
SBK Standard Bank Group Ltd
SHF Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd
SHP Shoprite Holdings Ltd
SLM Sanlam Ltd
SOL Sasol Ltd
TBS Tiger Brands Ltd
TRU Truworths International Ltd
VOD Vodacom Group Ltd
WHL Woolworths Holdings Ltd/South Africa
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A.2 BM&FBOVESPA Stocks
Equity Code Company
BBAS3 Banco do Brasil SA
BBDC4 Banco Bradesco SA
BISA3 Brookfield Incorporacoes SA
BRFS3 BRF SA
BRML3 BR Malls Participacoes SA
BTOW3 B2W Cia Digital
BVMF3 BM&FBOVESPA SA
CCRO3 CCR SA
CIEL3 Cielo SA
CMIG4 Cia Energetica de Minas Gerais
ECOD3 Vanguarda Agro SA
ELPL4 Eletropaulo Metropolitana Eletricidade de Sao Paulo SA
EMBR3 Embraer SA
FIBR3 Fibria Celulose SA
GFSA3 Gafisa SA
JBSS3 JBS SA
LAME4 Lojas Americanas SA
LIGT3 Light SA
LLXL3 Prumo Logistica SA
LREN3 Lojas Renner SA
PDGR3 PDG Realty SA Empreendimentos e Participacoes
PETR3 Petroleo Brasileiro SA
PETR4 Petroleo Brasileiro SA
RSID3 Rossi Residencial SA
SBSP3 Cia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo (SABESP)
USIM3 Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais SA
VALE5 Vale SA
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